Azerbaijan refers shamelessly to a 1992 military event, where,
according to then-Azerbaijani President Mutalibov, the responsibility
for the slaughter of the civilian population of the mostly Azeri city
of Khojalu near the capital Stepanakert of Nagorny Karabakh fully
falls on the Azeri opposition group, the Azerbaijani National Front.

     In the days following the event, President Mutalibov, in an
interview with Czech journalist Dana Mazalova published in the 2 April
1992 issue of the Russian newspaper Nizavisimaya Gazeta, said that the
militia of the Azerbaijani National Front actively obstructed and
actually prevented the exodus of the local population through the
mountain passages specifically left open by Karabakh Armenians to
facilitate the flight of the civilian population.

     (On this matter, the September 1992 report of the Helsinki Watch
international non-governmental organization quotes an Azerbaijani
woman who says that Armenians had notified the Azerbaijani civilian
population to leave the town with white flags raised.)  In fact the
Azerbaijani militia shot those who attempted to flee.

     The hope and intention of the Azerbaijani opposition was to
utilize civilian losses of such a magnitude to instigate a popular
uprising against the Baku regime and seize the reins of power.
Azerbaijan does not stop at simply distorting the truth.  Not only
does it falsely attribute its own opposition’s merciless slaughter of
Khojalu’s civilian population to Armenians, it brazenly characterizes
the killings as “distinctively inhumane and cruel” and “massacres”.
In so doing Azerbaijan fully comprehends that for the Armenian people
these terms unfailingly evoke memories of massacre and genocide in
Armenians’ distant – and recent – past.

     It is not coincidental that Azerbaijan has dared to make this
statement on the anniversary of the most bloody event of Armenia’s
recent history.  On 28 February 1988, when the people of Nagorny
Karabakh were arguing by peaceful and constitutional means for their
right to self-determination, Azerbaijani authorities organized and
armed a mob, which began pogroms against Armenians in the Azerbaijani
city of Sumgait.  The Sumgait massacres were followed by killings and
pillaging in Gianja in November 1988 and Baku in January 1990.

     In the spring of 1991, the very leaders of the current Azerbaijani
regime, assisted by the Soviet Army, organized the depopulation of the
Armenian regions of Northern Artzakh, and the deportation of the
Armenian population of Nagorny Karabakh and the surrounding 24
regions.  Helsinki Watch, in the above-mentioned report, testifies
that “these events were intended to exacerbate the fear and horror of
ethnic Armenians in other parts of Azerbaijan” and lead to the
deportation and ethnic cleansing of more than 600,000 Armenians.

     These atrocities were followed by a cycle of large-scale
Azerbaijani military offensives and operations designed to produce a
military solution to the conflict by annihilating the population of
Nagorny Karabakh.

     Although such acts have all taken place in the last decades of the
twentieth century, the people of Nagorny Karabakh experienced a
similar fate during the first two decades of this century as well.
The massacres and pogroms of 1905 in Baku, and 1918 and 1920 in
Shushi, where the entire city of Shushi was burned and its whole
population was annihilated, are still vivid memories.

     Therefore, this statement can only be seen as a crude, gross
violation of the norms and principles of international law.  While
fostering an aggressive and exclusive nationalism, Azerbaijan
blatantly promotes and incites ethnic hatred towards the population of
Nagorny Karabakh, with whom it continuously claims it can peacefully
and harmoniously live together.  Further, Azerbaijan proclaims it can
guarantee Karabakh’s security and peaceful existence, even while it
advances distrust and enmity by falsely accusing Armenians and
callously misrepresenting its own role and responsibility in recent
events.

     The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia once
again reiterates the warning sounded by the President of Armenia,
Levon Ter-Petrossian, during the Lisbon summit of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, that, in the event of imposed
Azerbaijani rule on Nagorny Karabakh, the people of Nagorny Karabakh
will face the threat of genocide.

Events on the territory controlled by Azerbaijan,
7 miles from Khojaly, after the Khojaly operation was over

When the military operation began in Khojaly, a large group of civilians and armed military personnel from Khojaly used the provided humanitarian corridor to exit the battlefield and began moving in the direction of the Azeri- controlled Agdam. Near Nakhichevanik village of Karabakh (outside of the provided corridor), the group provoked a gun battle with the defenders of Nakhichevanik, which resulted in numerous death on both sides. On February 28 and early March 1992, in the area then fully controlled by Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani and Turkish journalists videotaped images of the hundreds of killed and, during the second video shooting session, also mutilated bodies.

Since then, official Baku has falsified the events and used the human tragedy to persistently fan anti-Armenian hysteria to demonize the Armenian people in the eyes of the Azeris and the international community. It used the images to incite anti-Armenian sentiment and intolerance, which resulted in murders and calls from Azeris to wipe out Armenians as an ethnic group.

Conclusion

Responsibility for the tragic loss of civilian life on February 26-27, 1992 on the outskirts of Agdam, territory fully controlled by Azeri forces, lies with the political and military leadership of Azerbaijan.

First, the Azeri leadership used the territory of Khojaly for indiscriminate artillery attacks on civilian targets, thus turning the town into a legitimate military target for NKR Self-Defense Forces.

Second, the Azeri leadership intentionally prevented the civilian population from leaving the militarized village.

Third, the Azeri leadership failed to safely relocate civilians from Khojaly after public warnings of upcoming military operation, although it had many opportunities to do so.

Fourth, retreating Azeri forces provoked an exchange of fire with NKR Self-Defense Forces some five miles from Khojaly, which resulted in losses on both sides.

Fifth, those who had continued, full access to the site of reported close-range, mass killing are responsible for it. The reported killing of hundreds of civilians with incidences of barbaric mutilation of bodies took place near Agdam (some seven miles from Khojaly), on the territory controlled by Azeri forces. Free access to the site by Azeri and Turkish journalists is clear evidence to that end.

In addition, Azerbaijan continues to create ground for a prolonged human tragedy by inciting anti-Armenian sentiments and intolerance in Azeri society. Such a policy stalls efforts to build bridges between Armenian and Azeri people and achieve eventual, long-lasting peace between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh.

For nine years after the events in Khojaly official Baku has been obstinately fanning anti-Armenian hysteria with the aim of falsifying real events and discrediting the Armenian people in the eyes of the international community.

The events in Khojaly, which led to the death of civilians, were the results solely of political intrigues and a struggle for power in Azerbaijan.

The real reasons are most convincingly reflected in the accounts of Azerbaijanis themselves – as participants in and eyewitnesses of what happened – as well as of those who know the whole inside story of the events in Baku.

According to Azerbaijani journalist M. Safarogly, “Khojaly occupied an important strategic position. The loss of Khojaly was a political fiasco for Mutalibov”. 1

Khojaly, along with Shushi and Agdam, was one of the main strongholds from which Stepanakert, the capital of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, was shelled continuously and mercilessly for three winter months using artillery and missiles and launchers for targeting cities.

Knocking out the weapon emplacements in Khojaly and freeing the airport were the only way for the inhabitants of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic to ensure the physical survival of a population condemned by Azerbaijan to complete annihilation. The daily shelling of Stepanakert from nearby Khojaly took the lives of peaceful inhabitants – women, children and old people.

Former President of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov, has emphasized that “… the assault on Khojaly was not a surprise attack”2. In a “Nezavisimaya gazeta” newspaper interview he stated that “a corridor was kept open by the Armenians for people to leave”3. However, a column of civilians was fired on by armed units of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan on the approaches to the Agdam district border, a fact later confirmed by Ayaz Mutalibov, who linked this criminal act to attempts by the opposition to remove him from power, and blamed it entirely for what happened.

In his recent interview with the “Novoye vremya” magazine, Mutalibov confirms his statement of nine year ago: “The shooting of the Khojaly residents was obviously organized by someone to take control in Azerbaijan”4.

Similar comments and views concerning the events in Khojaly are known to have been made by several other highly-placed Azerbaijani officials and journalists.

There is, moreover, the conclusion of Azerbaijani journalist Arif Yunusov, which differs somewhat from the previous statements: “The town and its inhabitants were deliberately sacrificed for a political purpose – to prevent the Popular Front of Azerbaijan from coming to power”5. In this case, though, the Azerbaijanis themselves are named as the perpetrators of the tragedy.

What resulted from the betrayal of the inhabitants of Khojaly by their own highly placed compatriots is well known. Azerbaijani propaganda has railed to the whole world about the “atrocities of the Armenians”, supplying television stations with horrendous pictures of a field strewn with mutilated bodies. Khojaly is claimed to have been the “Armenians’ revenge for Sumgait”.

Tamerlan Karayev, at one time Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan Republic, bears witness: “The tragedy was committed by the authorities of Azerbaijan”, and specifically by “someone highly placed”6.

The Czech journalist Jana Mazalova, who by an oversight of the Azerbaijanis was included in both of the groups of press representatives to be shown the “bodies mutilated by the Armenians”, noted a substantial difference in the two cases. When she went to the scene immediately after the events, Mazalova did not see any traces of barbarous treatment of the bodies. Yet a couple of days later the journalists were shown disfigured bodies already “prepared” for pictures.

Who killed the peaceful inhabitants of Khojaly and then mutilated their bodies, if the tragedy occurred not in a village taken by Armenians or on the route of the humanitarian corridor, but on the approaches to the town of Agdam – on territory fully controlled by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan?

The independent Azerbaijani cameraman Chingiz Mustafayev, who took pictures on 28 February and 2 March 1992, had doubts about the official Azerbaijani version and began his own inquiry. The journalist’s very first report to the Moscow news agency “D-press” on the possible complicity of the Azerbaijani side in the crimes cost Mustafayev his life: he was killed nor far from Agdam, under circumstances that are still unexplained.

The current President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, himself recognized that Azetbaijan’s “former leadership was also guilty” of events in Khojaly. Already in April 1992, according to the agency Bilik-Dunyasy, he had commented as follows: “The bloodshed will be to our advantage. We should not interfere in the course of events”. To whose “advantage” was the bloodshed is clear to everyone. “Megapolis-Express” wrote: “It cannot be denied that if the Popular Front of Azerbaijan actually set far-reaching objectives, they have been achieved. Mutalibov has been compromised and overthrown, public opinion worldwide has been shaken, and the Azerbaijanis and their Turkish brethren have believed in the so-called “genocide of the Azerbaijani people in Khojaly”7.

One other tragic detail. It has become clear since the events that 47 Armenian hostages were already being held on 26 February in “peaceful” Khojaly, a fact that the Azerbaijani mass media “covering” the tragedy have failed to mention. After the liberation of Khojaly only 13 hostages (including 6 woman and 1 child) were found there, the other 34 having been taken away by the Azerbaijanis to an unknown location. The only thing known about them is that they were led from the village on the night of the operation, but never reached Agdam. There is still no information concerning what eventually happened to them or confirming that they continued to be held captive by the Azerbaijanis.

Obviously, those who wanted to create the impression that bodies had been mutilated by the Armenians first of all disfigured the bodies of those same Armenian hostages, in order to make it impossible to identify them. Precisely for that purpose the outer clothing was removed from many of the bodies and precisely for that reason the bodies of the unfortunate victims were damaged so badly that they became unrecognizable.

In the light of the above facts it may confidently be said that the killing of peaceful inhabitants of the village of Khojaly and of the Armenian hostages being held there was the work of the Azerbaijani side, which committed this crime against its own people in the name of political intrigues and the struggle for power.

_________________________________________________

1. “Nezavisimaya gazeta” newspaper, February 1993
2. “Ogonek” magazine, Nos. 14-15, 1992
3. “Nezavisimaya gazeta” newspaper, 2 April 1992
4. “Novoye vremya” magazine, 6 March 2001
5. “Zerkalo” newspaper, July 1992
6. “Mukhalifat” newspaper, 28 April 1992
7. “Megapolis-Express”, No. 17, 1992

“As the survived Khojalu dwellers speak, all of that was organized to have a reason for my resignation. I do not think, that the Armenians, who have very precise and professional approach to similar situations, could allow Azerbaijanis to have documents denouncing them in fascist actions. It is possible to assume, that someone was interested in showing these shots later on the session of the Supreme Soviet and to blame me in all those things.”

If I declare that that the culprits are from Azerbaijani opposition they will say that I discredit them. But the important thing is that the corridor, to enable people to flee, was left by Armenians. And why for to shoot then? Especially on the territory close to Aghdam, where at that moment enough forces were deployed to come and help people. Or simply made an agreement to withdraw people. We practiced this all the time.

They were saying me all the time that Khojalu people stay firmly and they need armament, men force and food. I ordered to do so helicopter pilots. But pilots, as I was explained, rejected to fly there, since they lacked sets to escape from stingers (At the time of interview Armenian forces of Self Defense had no any anti aircraft weapons, including Stingers, – H. D., L. M.-Sh.)

So a week had passed. There, Aghdam contingent was deployed near, which was obliged always to follow the developments. When military vehicles surrounded Khojalu, they should evacuate population. Before that the similar order I gave on Shushi: men staying, women and children to be evacuated. This is the rule of war too: they should be saved. My behavior was objective and clear: I gave such orders, but why they did not implement them, it is not clear for me.

By the way I have spoken several times with Mkrtchyan, Chairmen of Supreme Soviet of NKR: “You destroyed thousands of people, give an opportunity to take their bodies”. He replied me no bodies should be, and that our people stay there and they food them despite of lack of food, and they are ready to exchange hostages”.

When you were informed about casualties?

On the next day after it was informed that in Khojalu several people were killed. It was information of the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Who was responsible for such information?

Minister himself. At the moment Press service was formed at the Ministry of Defense. After the helicopter crash we agreed not to give unreliable information. (sic! – H. D., L. M.-Sh.)

Do you think that Prime Minister Hasan Hasanov is responsible?

The head of government, of course, he is responsible for all, but he would not take the responsibility for it, saying that such questions are not included in his responsibilities. But government is government.

Are you ready to take part in presidential elections, scheduled in July 7?

I want they leave me in calm. I don’t want all false to be addressed to me, making me a scapegoat, as it very common among us. If they will fail to keep their promise to guarantee my security and normal life for president, I will be forced to move in political struggle and mobilize people.

If NFA lose credit and people ask you to return, you should do so?

If people ask me, I will do so. I have a strong will, but sacrificing myself, I’d tried to demonstrate that the power is not the important thing. I am full with energy and I understand well in politics. I am normal, communicable and contactable man. I am humanist in my soul and never want blood or revenge. And people like me we need today.

Did your resigning bring some favor for you?

At first, this unpleasant fact did not change my human character. If it happens and I will be ruler, I am going to be more strict, taking into account that several representatives of the society are not the whole nation.
Thank you.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 02. 04. 2004.

BAKINSKI RABOCHI, Baku, 29. 08. 1991.

Elman Mamedov, Mayor of Khojalu, We relied on the support of republic. Everyday we called to Aghdam, and every time they assured as: OK tomorrow we will carry out an operation to break the blockade. I asked to send helicopters to evacuate elder people, women and children. But the promised help did not come.

BAKINSKI RABOCHI, Baku, 29. 08. 1991.

Salman Abbasov – Several days before the tragedy Armenians periodically informed as via radiophone that there are going to seize the city and demanded to leave. For long time helicopter resumed their flights to Khojalu, and it was not clear, does someone think about our fate, and does it interest someone. No any assistance practically we got. Moreover, when it was possible to evacuate women, children and elders, they convinced us to stay. They promised that soon an operation would be undertaken to seize Askeran and break the blockade of Khojalu. It did not happen… why to deceive us, why for our children died, who is responsible for that?

BAKINSKI RABOCHI, Baku, 07. 03. 1992

Most probably, this way the Azerbaijani authorities tried to erase from the memory humanity the bloody Armenian pogroms in Sumgait (February 1988) and in Baku (January 1990) as well as the mass killings of Armenians in Maragha and Khramorth villages in summer 1992. On the other hand Baku tries to use accusations to address the Armenians as one more «weighty» proof of its ambitious demands towards Armenian territories, which are justified neither legally, nor historically.

However, the more important thing is that authorities of modern Azerbaijan are trying to forcibly attach the intolerable burden of genocidal psychology to its own people. Imposing of feeling of genocide and its subsequent politization is a not less heavy crime before the Azerbaijanis. The atmosphere of revanchism cultivating among Azerbaijani society is aimed to play down social hardships and dissatisfaction of Azerbaijanis.

No doubt that during the time bitter truth about massacre of Khojalu civilians will be known to the world. Then neither the former Azerbaijani authorities and their foreign protectors, nor the current authorities cannot justify themselves for this crime and especially before their OWN PEOPLE

Logically, Armenian traces in this tragedy could serve as a convenient occasion “to wash off” from Azerbaijan the shameful facts of Armenian pogroms in 1988 in Sumgait and in Baku in 1990, when, according to the official Soviet data, more than 300 Armenians were tortured and killed.

After a long pause the Speaker of parliament of Azerbaijan Elmira Kafarova declared, that the attack of the Armenian armed forces on Khojalu had been repulsed, and that only two Azerbaijani soldiers had been killed.⁵⁹

After some silence the Minister of Interior of Azerbaijan T. Kerimov informed “Interfax” news agency the following figures: 100 killed, 250 wounded and about 300 missing.⁶⁰

“… According to the eyewitnesses, for many of them, February 26 became the last day in their life … In searches of save heaven women, children and old men moved to Agdam. But on the way to the Armenian village of Nakhichavanik they were caught by bullets. The people died, their bodies remained on the place of another tragedy … The Aghdam hospital was overflowed: the number of patients from Khudjalu only made almost 120″.⁶¹

In the first week of March Western media reported about thousands of killed civilians, mainly getting the inofrmation from the Azerbaijani and Turkish mass media.⁶²

By then T. Goltz announced the official number of victims – 478. In his first publication in Sunday Times and in The Azerbaijan Diary, he mentioned that it is the exact figure brought by Sadik Sadikov, a cleric from Aghdam mosque. According to this information, widely disseminated T. Goltz, 478 corpses were buried in Agdam, according to Islamic funeral tradition of burying the bodies within 24 hours after death (more correctly, before the sunset – H. D., L. M.-Sh.).⁶³

Moreover, 5 days after the events the Azerbaijani news agency Assa Irade informed that the special units discovered corpses of 1234 men. This information at once was picked up by Turkish mass media, which published these data.⁶⁴

The head of the press-service of the President of Azerbaijan Rasim Agaev informed to the correspondent Russian Nezavisimaya gazeta, with the reference to the Khojalu Mayor Elman Mamedov, that the Armenian attack on Khojalu resulted in thousands of civilians killed, several thousands wounded, and there was no information about the fate of 1500 people.⁶⁵ And one month after the Karabakh newspaper in March 26, 1992 wrote that the State commission for assistance to refugees from Khojalu provided allowances for families of 476 people missing.

On March 2 the international movement For Democratic Reforms and Human Rights in Azerbaijan sent a text of appeal to the diplomatic missions of foreign countries in Moscow titled “To the Nations of the World”, in which claimed that “In the night on February 26, 1992 the Armenian national army with the participation CIS 366-th regiment leveled to the ground the city of Khojalu. That night 1234 Azerbaijanis were killed”.⁶⁶

The report by the Moscow based human rights protection center Memorial mentioned that in Aghdam, where all refugees arrived, the state forensic medical examination of 181 bodies (130 males, 51 females, including 13 children) was carried out. The experts concluded that the death among 151 people was caused because of bullet wounds, 20 men – were killed by shell wounds, and 10 – by using a blunt object.⁶⁷

It should be mentioned that the Memorial observers operated with the official data provided by the Azerbaijani officials, since the collection of information by experts of the center was carried out from the March 7th to the April 5th, 1992, i. e. 10 days after the events.⁶⁸

In his book T. Goltz brought some data about medical examination of bodies, which he estimated with a little difference – 187.⁶⁹ Undeclared Karabakhi officials informed the Russian experts about transferring of 120-130 bodies to Aghdam (all of them included civilians and soldiers killed in Khojalu and nearby Nakhijevanik village) of which 96 were buried in Aghdam, (but not 478 as Goltz claims – H. D., L. M.-Sh.) and, the bodies of others were taken away by relatives.⁷⁰

In the Baku based Ordu newspaper the May 1992 issue informed that the names of 479 killed were identified, while those of 200 still had to be identified. The number of 700 as a real number of killed was confirmed also by Leyla Yunusova, Press Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan.⁷¹

But soon this figure increased to 688 lost and 400 disappeared. An explanation can be found in Goltz’s book, who said that exactly 688 body bags were requested in Aghdam based branch of the International Red Cross.⁷²

Next, in a report at the session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CSCE (now OSCE) member countries the head of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry Hasan Hasanov claimed about “more then eight hundred” killed.

Probably badly familiar with the climate in Karabakh Tomas Goltz believed that with approach of spring and snow melting the figure 478 would increase. However, with the coming of summer and autumn in the official Azerbaijan reports and documents the number of victims began to decrease.

In November 12, 1992 the Parliamentary Commission for investigation Khojalu incident appeared with a final report before Milli Majlis, which informed that “during the tragedy in Khojalu about four thousand civilians were estimated (whom according to T. Goltz only 40 (!) soldiers defended – H. D., L. M.-Sh.).

According to the data of the Commission during these events 450 people had been killed, 400 wounded, 80 disappeared and 20 men were taken hostage”. The commission found that “the leadership of the republic had all the opportunities, by organizing protection of the city, to prevent tragedy and to withdraw population with the least losses”.

The members of the investigation commission concluded that “it has not taken place because of mistakes made in selection of the cadres, default of the official duties by the ex-President Ayaz Mutalibov, former Prime Minister Hasan Hasanov, Minister of Interior T. Kerimov, Minister of National Security Vagif Huseynov, Head of General Staff Musaev and others. ⁷³

Later, when the Popular Front of Azerbaijan came to power, Vagif Huseynov, former Minister of National Security of Azerbaijan, shortly before his arrest said hinting on some political figures of PFA that “January events of 1990 in Baku and events in Khojalu were the handwork of the same people”.⁷⁴

But the masterpiece of the situation and intentional distortion of the past was the “Decree of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Genocide of the Azerbaijanis”, issued in March 31, 1998, which stated that “In February 1992, the Armenians committed the unprecedented massacre of the population of the town of Khojaly. This bloody tragedy, which became known as the Khojaly genocide, involved the extermination of thousands of Azerbaijanis; the town was razed from the face of the earth.”⁷⁵ All previous years former President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev manipulated with several hundreds lives of his compatriots. For example, in 1998, appearing on the occasion of anniversary of the Khojalu events he again pointed on “several thousands of victims.”⁷⁶ But the editors of Azadinform news agency corrected the President a little bit, naming instead of “thousands” a concrete number of victims – 613.

Another important assumption is that to increase the number of victims and missing, Baku authorities could simply use Meskhetian Turk refugees who were settled in Khojalu and had no registration as “dead souls”.

* * *

The first information about Khojalu massacre were sent to world mass media by Turkish and foreign journalists accredited in Turkey. The first publication about the events in the Western printed media appeared in the Washington Post authored by Tomas Goltz. However, in this article there was no data about the number of casualties. It is possible, that he had sent a material from Baku before his trip to Aghdam and it was based on unreliable sources.⁷⁷ Soon, another of his articles appeared in the Sunday Times where he informed about 450 casualties with the reference on the information from survived Khodjalu inhabitant. According to this publication by February 29, 1992 in the morgue of Aghdam 479 corpses were registered of which 29 were already buried in a city cemetery.⁷⁸

It is symptomatically, before Tomas Goltz arrival in Azerbaijan at the end of 1991, he had been working in Turkey for long time. His Turkish wife, Hijran Goltz worked with him while in Azerbaijan, and she had sent the information about the massacre near Aghdam to the Turkish section of BBC.⁷⁹ Ankara based correspondent of Reuters Eliph Kaban during those days was together with Goltz in Aghdam. He had a portable telefax with him and the first messages for Reuters were received from him by March 1.⁸⁰

It is noteworthy that the Turkish correspondents kindly offered their services of interpreter to foreign journalists both in selection of materials, and during the interviews. By the special eagerness in providing similar services were distinguished Rahbar Bashiroglu, the correspondent of the Turkish newspaper Milliet and Ahmet Sel operator of the 5th channel of the French TV and Belgian RTF broadcasting company.⁸¹

⁶⁰ Aydin Mehtiyev, Nagorno-Karabakh: more bloog and arms, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27. 02. 1992. Ermeniler bir Azeri kasabasini geclidi, Hürriyet, Ankara, 28. 02. 1992, COVCAS Bulleten, March 5, 1992.

⁶¹ Bakinski rabochi, Baku, 28.02.1992.

⁶² See The Times, 02.03.1992, The New York Times, 03.03.1992, The Boston Globe, 02.03.1992.

⁶³ T. Goltz, op. cit. pp. 122-123.

⁶⁴ See, Bariş cabalari nafile, Milliyet, 02.03.1992.

⁶⁵ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29.02.1992.

⁶⁶ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 04.03.1992.

⁶⁷ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992.

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ T. Goltz, op. cit. p. 130.

⁷⁰ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992.

⁷¹ The Independent, London, 12.06.1992.

⁷² T. Goltz, op. cit. p. 130.

⁷³ Sohbet Mamedov, The tragedy of Khojalu could be prevented, Izvestia, Moscow, 14. 11. 1992.

⁷⁴ V. B. Haruthunyan, Events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Chronics, part 4, Yerevan, 1994, p. 120.

⁷⁵ The National Histories in the Soviet and Post-Soviet states, see Appendix, М., 1999, pp. 403-404.

⁷⁶ See Azadinform, Baku, # 31 (61), 26.02.1998.

⁷⁷ The Washington Post, 28.02.1992.

⁷⁸ Tomas Goltz, Armenian soldiers massacre hundreds of fleeng Families, The Sunday Times, 01.03.1992.

⁷⁹ Millyet, Ankara, 06.03.1992. T. Goltz, op. cit. p. 124.

⁸⁰ T. Goltz, op. cit. p. 124.

⁸¹ Khojalu: Chronics of genocide, pp. 119-120.

The armed soldiers of the Khojalu defense forces were running away from the village together with the civilian population. On the approaches to the Armenian village of Nakhijevanik they run on Armenian villagers’ self-defense positions. As a result of the fighting the first Armenian post was destroyed (2 men were killed, 10 were wounded). Some Azerbaijani soldiers also were among casualties as the result of this clash.

Above mentioned S. Abbasov, who was among defenders of Khojalu, confessed afterwards, that after destruction of the Armenian post near Nakhijevanik village “we managed to have a narrow escape with the help from Aghdam”.⁵⁸ Aghdam forces “arrived in time”, and Khojalu civilians “made their way”, as was already marked, right on the fields, where the corpses were found later. It is clear that no Armenian military unit could be stationed in the territory under control of large Azerbaijani armed forces.

The number of efficient military groups of the Armenians were limited at that time, and practically all of them were involved the Khojalu operation. It should be mentioned that in the beginning of 1992 the military clashes between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces only began, and both sides were at the initial stage of formation of armed forces.

As it was mentioned, the operation on suppression of fire emplacements in and around Khojalu and de-blockading of the only airport began at 23:00 p. m. with artillery bombardment. At 23:30 infantry moved towards Khojalu but no serious resistance Armenian forces met in the city. The majority of Khojalu civilians together with the Azerbaijani soldiers left the village in panic. At 01:30 Armenians intercepted an Azerbaijani radiogram, in which remaining Azerbaijani forces reported to Shushi and Aghdam headquarters about their decision to follow fleeing civilians towards Aghdam direction.

However one-two small groups of Azeris were blocked by the Armenians and continued their resistance till 4 o’clock in the morning. Except them no Azerbaijanis remained in Khojalu at that moment. In a telephone conversation Artur Mkrtchyan, President of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with the Azerbaijani colleague said that “They (civilian population of Khojalu – H. D., L. M.-Sh.,) left Khojalu before it was occupied by Armenian forces”. The distance to the place, where afterwards the numerous corpses of civilians were found is approximately 11-12 km by highway and 3-4 km less by a direct route.

Taking into account, that the inhabitants went in darkness and on off-road, and that among them there were women, elderly and children, it is possible to assume, that they passed this distance within 5-6 hours. It means that Khojalu civilians and retreating soldiers approached to the vanguard posts near Aghdam not later than at five o’clock in the morning. And it is not occasional that could be taken for attacking Armenians. It is very possible since armed forces positioned near Aghdam moved towards Armenian village of Nakhijevanik and their behavior in a night time incursion probably was very nervous. Chingiz Mustafaev rightly pointed out that armed formations of Aghdam could take the crowd of refugees for attacking Armenians (it is noteworthy that it was occurring in February in a total darkness -. H. D. L. M.-Sh.) and, to open heavy fire from machine guns against them. Then, to hide the traces of their fatal mistakes they mutilated and destroyed corpses on the next day trying to blame on Armenians for the crime.

Difficult to say how this assumption of the Azerbaijani journalist corresponds with the reality; however, the fact is that Khojalu civilians were killed on the territory fully controlled by the Azerbaijani armed forces.

After the assault rumors spread in Baku that the Armenian soldiers seized Khojalu and made savage reprisals against the settlers of the village, saving neither women nor children. Mutalibov immediately called the ministers of interior T. Kerimov and state security I. Husseinov to his place, who confirmed the rumors about the death of many people.

Moreover, after getting informed about the mass killings of Azerbaijanis in Khojalu, the President of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov called with the NKR authorities in Stepanakert. In the frequently referred work by K. Stolyarov the author cites an interesting talk between Mutalibov and the President of the Supreme Soviet of NKR A. Mkrtchyan: “What war is it?! Even the fascists wouldn’t afford themselves such atrocities against the civilians!” According to Stolyarov, during the talk Mutalibov had mentioned a number of 800 to 1000 people killed. To this A. Mrtchyan replied at a loss: “What are you speaking about, the population was given a corridor. They left Khojalu before the seizure of the village. Part of your people had left for Stepanakert and they are with us right now. We feed them, though we lack food ourselves. So make it out, you are misinformed.” Mutalibov brings the same talk in an interview given to a Czech journalist Dana Mazalova that was later reprinted in the Moscow press.³⁴

After the telephone talk with A. Mktrchyan and the Minister of Interior of NKR A. Isagulov, it is likely that Mutalibov, who did not trust the Armenian side, decided to send a group of journalists to check the fact objectively.

A group of journalist from Baku and abroad was nearby during the studies period, in the town of Aghdam. The President of Azerbaijan, negotiating and getting the consent from Ye. Shaposhnikov beforehand, further called the commander of the Transcaucasus Military District V. Patrikeev, who allotted two helicopters to deliver the journalists to Khojalu.

The first flight of the helicopter with Azerbaijani journalists on board was made on February 29 1992. Interesting to notice, the journalists, informed about mass killings of Azerbaijanis in Khojalu, initially flied there. Finding nothing to confirm the information, they returned. In the nearby of the Armenian village of Nakhijevanik they saw tens of bodies of the Khojalu defenders, who had died during the night fight.

Thus, before February 29 the mass killings of Azerbaijanis were those several tens of Azerbaijani soldiers and some civilians, died nearby the village of Nakhijevanik. How and why they were killed? It is worth mentioning that the rumors about the mass killings of the Khojalu settlers were spread in Baku well before the beginning of the assault.³⁵

Many things about the developments nearby Nakhijevanik are clarified by an interesting detail, which one can find in the memories of a witness Suleyman Abbasov, who was among the group of the Khojalu inhabitants pulling out. Among other things he said: “We together with a part of the inhabitants reached the village of Nakhijevanik hoping to find asylum there: before it we were informed through a portable transmitter the village was seized from Armenian combatants. We heard the first shots… A short fighting set in, and we managed to break through the covering force.” (The emphasizing is ours – H.D., L.M-Sh.)³⁶ As we can see the pulling out Azerbaijanis were simply deceived from Aghdam through a portable transmitter and were directed toward the Armenian stations by the village of Nakhijevanik, thus provoking a clash with the Armenian stations defending the village. Armeinan witnesses from the volunteer corps soldiers of Nakhijevanik confirm: the impression was that the group of Azerbaijani soldiers surrendering from Khojalu deliberately turned to their stations and catched the unaware of the defending villagers. As a result of the clash two villagers among the defending were killed and 10 wounded.

A reasonable question arises: did Armenians need create conditions for the Khojalu people to move out of the siege only to let the surrendering Azerbaijani forces to kill the defenders of Armenian villages armed with hunting rifles? Of course no. And then: what was the Aghdamis’ purpose to direct the Khojalu forces toward a deliberately wrong road full of dangers?

We believe, there was no purpose in that. The Aghdam detachments of Azerbaijanis were simply trying to convince the Khojalu people, that they were making all the efforts to defend Khojalu, and that they had already advanced in that direction. We suppose neither the Aghdamis believed Armenians would indeed let the Khojalu forces out of the siege. And lastly, we believe, the Khojalu people were shot by the Aghdamis themselves, likely having taken them for the attacking Armenians.

The fact that the people were fired point-blank, i.e. from the side of Aghdam is evidenced by the witnesses. Mayor of Khojalu Elman Mamedov: “…the few defenders of the town and the civilians remaining by that time alive, surrendered to the forest, wading the bitter river. The night through our carts with women, children, and elderly, wounded was making its way through the forest. By the morning we reached the edge of the wood – ahead there were the fields of the Armenian village of Nakhijevanik. Here we faced a point-blank fire of machine guns and grenade cup discharges. The forceless live targets were fired grimly. Many of my countrymen and relatives died here. Me and my seven friends, armed with guns, were trying to shield them. Although unsuccessfully. Completely isolated we laid down on the snow in the gorge for twelve hours, having no opportunity even to raise head because of the shooting. ” ³⁷

Deputy Commander of the helicopter squadron Major Leonid Kravets says: “On February 26th I was taking away the wounded from Stepanakert and was on my way back through the Askeran gates. I saw some bright points beneath. I lost height and there my flight engineer shouted: “Look, women and children over there.” I saw some two hundred killed spread across the slope, armed people wandering among them… As is considered, those were refugees from Khojalu. Somewhere further than 800 meters before the front stations of Azerbaijanis an ambush was waiting for them. (The emphasizing is ours – H.D., L.M.-Sh.) A little girl narrowly escaped.”³⁸

How did the poorly armed small number of Armenian self-defense forces of Nakhijevanik managed to shoot down for several hours the civilians right under the nose of the Azerbaijani positions nearby Aghdam and stroll about on a territory accessible for any rifle weapon? Worthy to mention, the place is lowland with no natural shelters. The brought propositions quite vividly speak for themselves.

Further. The majority of the perished inhabitants of Khojalu were killed 10-12 kilometers from Khojalu itself, two-three kilometers from Aghdam, where, as already shown, a vast number of troops and ammunition was concentrated. This very fact is being thoroughly hidden by the Azerbaijani propagandists, or simply is not being mentioned. It is absolutely obvious that with the availability of such arsenals in Aghdam the Armenians were simply unable to hide so skillfully, first, to kill coolly the refugees from Khojalu, and then, to return in several days to profane the bodies. Presumably, the answers to the raised questions are known only to the activists of the PFA. We will simply try to focus the reader’s attention on facts.

The corridor to Aghdam, allotted by the Armenians for the inhabitants of Khojalu, naturally, left aside the Armenian settlements. The clash between the surrendering Khojalu fighters and the defenders of Nakhijevanik village was a surprise to both sides.

The armed detachments of Aghdam in fact did advanced the night from 25th to 26th of February 1992, but no one attacked either Nakhijevanik or any other Armenian village during the days under study. Very important to mention, that the armed forces advanced from Aghdam moved forward very slightly. Just to the place where the bodies of Khojalu people were found. They settled there for a long time, up to 1993, when Armenians destroyed the fire emplacements already in Aghdam.

Curiously, according to K. Stolyarov the rumor about the seizure of Khojalu and the mass killings of its inhabitants spread in Baku in evening of February 25th, i.e. several hours before the beginning of the assault or even the artillery shooting (as mentioned above, the last started in 23:00, 30 minutes before the assault).³⁹ Someone in Baku had likely been in a haste to spread the information. Neither the Minister of Interior T. Kerimov, nor the Minister of Security V. Huseinov, according to their own assurances, was unable to identify the sources of the information. And then A. Mutalibov decided to call the President of the Supreme Soviet of NKR A. Mkrtchyan. It was the morning of February 26th.

The press service of Ministry of Interior of Azerbaijan, realizing that the loss of Khojalu meant political fiasco for Mutalibov, in the evening of the same day announced that “the attack of the Armenian fighters and the 366th regiment of the former Soviet Army on Khojalu is repelled and the settlement is controlled by the Azerbaijani forces again.”

However, the information service of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan denied this information, and informed that “two lorries overflowed by corpses of the killed inhabitants of Khojalu arrived in Aghdam”. It also informed, that among others who were killed during the defense fighting for Khojalu were the chief of the airport, public prosecutor and mayor of city. After the fall of Khojalu in Baku the explosive situation was created.⁴⁰

President Mutalibov who in the beginning of March 1992 sent a telegram to the presidents of the states of CIS, having offered to create an interstate commission “for investigation of the genocide of the Azerbaijani population of Khojalu”⁴¹, literally one month after, in the interview to Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta said the following: “As the survived Khojalu dwellers speak, all of that was organized to have a reason for my resignation. I do not think, that the Armenians, who have very precise and professional approach to similar situations, could allow Azerbaijanis to have documents denouncing them in fascist actions. It is possible to assume, that someone was interested in showing these shots later on the session of the Supreme Soviet and to blame me in all those things.”⁴²

As Kiril Stolyarov writes later, when Ayaz Mutalibov was ousted from presidency, a well-known Azerbaijani TV journalist Chingiz Mustafayev telling him about the flight to Khojalu, mentioned, that “he did not manage to shot corpses in Kodjalu, for there was nothing looked even like dead bodies there” (italics ours -. H. D., L-M Sh.). During the first flight the journalists recorded only a couple of dozens of corpses of Azerbaijani soldiers found near of Armenian village of Nakhijevanik.⁴³ However, the majority of corpses were found near Aghdam and this was recorded on a video camera on February 29 in the first time and, on March 2 in second time. These very shots were shown in Baku at the session of Milli Majlis and later on many TV channels of the world, as a proof of mass murder of the Azerbaijani population of Khojalu.

Let’s leave emotions in the party. The single fact that both parts of the film were shot in the presence of numerous Azerbaijani officials in the civilian dresses and military uniform (they are present constantly in the film), is the evidence that the «dead field» territory was under the control of the Azerbaijani armed formations. Otherwise one should assume, that the Armenians left a humanitarian corridor for Azerbaijanis from Khojalu (otherwise they simply could not flee from the village), then hunted them out to kill nearby Aghdam and then to retreat (we shall not forget that in Aghdam powerful military units were deployed).

After it the same Armenians seized again the same territory only to mutilate the dead bodies and to recede again, once again leaving Azeri cameramen to record a second film this time with solid evidence of brutalities of Armenians giving them an opportunity to show all these worldwide as a proof of real nature of “Armenian bloodsuckers”.

The assumption that Armenian forces had cold-bloodily planned and carried out such a sophisticated operation to murder unarmed civilians whom they first had let out safely from the battle zone could arise only in the inflamed imagination of a man-hater.

On the other hand, the corpses of the people were really mutilated. During the second flight in the area of the mass murder, already on March 2, 1992, the journalists noticed, that in comparison with the first survey, the positions of bodies on the ground and the degree of damages and wounds, had changed significantly. Having noticed that corpses were damaged and moved comparing with the initial survey Chingiz Mustafaev (Fuat Ogly) informed about this President of Azerbaijan, who at the time obviously was aware about the reasons of the tragedy. President A. Mutalibov answered really with prophetic words: “Chingiz, don’t tell a word to anybody that you noticed something wrong: otherwise you will be killed”.⁴⁴

The President’s warning did not keep Mustafaev from initiating an independent journalistic investigation of the tragedy, having doubted about the “Armenian trace” of the mass killings.

The courageous journalist managed only to send two materials Moscow based DR PRESS information agency, in which he informed about his suspicions about the involvement of Azerbaijani circles in this crime. Soon Chengiz Mustafaev was killed in the same field where he continued his investigation, far from the frontline…

The same fate befell also the field commander Ala Yakub, who stated in the presence of informer that “…he could shed light on the massacre at Nakhijevanik village and bring essential details about the crash of the helicopter in the Karabakh sky with numerous statesmen on board. After the Popular Front of Azerbaijan came to power in summer 1992 he was arrested and died in the jail under the obscure circumstances…”.⁴⁵

However let’s again listen to the former President A. Mutalibov who “would not like his name in the history of Azerbaijan to be connected with this event”.⁴⁶ He fairly specified, that after the humanitarian corridor was left for exodus of the Khojalu inhabitants, it was meaningless to shoot on the leaving people, “… especially in the territory close to Aghdam, where by that time enough forces were concentrated to come and help the people…”⁴⁷

The videocassette of Chingiz Mustafaev with the bodies of the killed Azeris, initially was shown during the session of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, chaired then by Yakub Mamedov. Then they were shown on the Azerbaijani TV, and soon by other foreign TV channels. In Baku this film caused a wave of indignation against the President.

This indignation PFA party member used as an advantage, for whom important was not the fact of the mass murder of the people near Aghdam, but “the successful pretext to convert the anger of Azerbaijanis against the President”.⁴⁸ By the way, in his speech on the session President Mutalibov, who at that time already guessed about the real culprits of the tragedy, never accused the Armenians for implementing the mass murder.
On March 6, 1992, i.e. in ten days after the massacre Mutalibov resigned. Soon afterwards, the ex-President overtly expressed doubts about the Armenian responsibility for Khojalu killings, hinting on the fact that some of the Azeri inhabitants might have actually been killed by Azeri forces in order to discredit him.⁴⁹

The correspondent of the Azerbaijani newspaper Bakinski rabochi Ibrahim Shukurov has written: “… There are lots of questions. And all of them are reduced to one: why the act of genocide became possible in Khojalu? Certainly, not in the last instance the causes of tragedy became our failures on the Karabakh battlefields. The series of military defeats resulted in handing over one settlement after another. And all of them were strategically important. But it is necessary not to rule out the factor of unfair political games around Nagorno-Karabakh. It is obvious, that someone was very much interested in breaking the peacekeeping mission of Velayati. The assault of Khojalu was undertaken at the moment when the agreement on ceasefire was reached…” ⁵⁰

In a month, in the beginning of May, when the pre-election campaign in Azerbaijan was in its culmination, the news about fall of city of Shushi came. This gave an opportunity for ex-Communist Supreme Soviet to cancel Mutalibov’s resignation on May 14, 1992, removing all accusations for Khojalu. The Milli Majlis was dissolved.
Soon after restoration in his former rights, A. Mutalibov contacted with Moscow and in a telephone conversation with Russian Marshal of Air Forces Yevgeni Shaposhnikov said the following: “Believe me, Elchibey is a Pan-Turkist fanatic zealous to be embraced by Ankara, where, as far as I am aware, they promised all kind of assistance.” ⁵¹

Very soon Mutalibov again was removed from his office. On the next day the PFA supporters seized the building of the Supreme Soviet and took the presidential palace, causing Mutalibov to flee to Moscow.

Ayaz Mutalibov was right. Ankara was not pleased with his person, especially after Mutalibov signed an agreement to join the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States. During the first months after the demise of the USSR, Turkey, supported by the West, vigorously tried to present itself as a model for nation-building for former Soviet Muslim republics. In the person of the PFA the Turkish side found an important partner for strengthening its influence in Azerbaijan.

In this connection the news published in the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet of May 17, 1992, 2 days after Mutalibov’s second overthrow from his office, is a sensation. In the front-page of the newspaper the words of high ranking officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were cited, saying “Our boys have done it“.⁵² It is not difficult to guess who were those boys.

Here quite natural and logical question arises: maybe the same “Turkish boys” from Turkey’s secret services stand behind the Khojalu massacre? It is absolutely evident that in this case Ankara by one stone killed at least three birds.

First, after Armenia proclaimed independence, Turkey became concerned with the possibility of activization the Armenian Diaspora led policy of official recognition of Armenian Genocide carried out by the Ottoman Turkish government in 1915-1918 and the perspective of possible reparations to the ancestors of the victims. From this point of view the representation of the Armenians as people inclined to mass murders, suited Turkey well, which could find in Khojalu events a convenient occasion for creation of opposite image.

Secondly, as was already mentioned above, the pro-Russian President of Azerbaijan Ayaz Mutalibov was not the right person for Ankara, which would prefer to see obviously a pro-Turkish president in his place elected from the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. Abulfaz Elchibey, the leader of PFA, did not hide his sympathies to all Turkish, constantly making statements in aggressive Pan-Turkist spirit.

The involvement of the Turkish secret agents in operations on correcting of the political leadership of Azerbaijan dates back to 1918, and it is possible to consider that the Febraury-May events of 1992 can be viewed as the first and well-planned attempt for revival of those traditions. Sufficient to say that when Heydar Aliev came to power in Azerbaijan in the late 1993, some of his internal and external policy steps displeased Turkish secret services, which undertook at least two assassination attempts.

The first attempt was so impertinent and overt that in 1995, during her official visit to Baku the Prime Minister of Turkey Tansu Ciller had to personally apologize before the President of Azerbaijan “for uncontrollable behavior of the rightists.” ⁵³

The second attempt took place one year later in 1996, and this time the Azerbaijani security service arrested the several persons, directly connected with special services of Turkey.⁵⁴

Interestingly, on February 25 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Ali Akbar Velayati paid a visit to Baku with mediation mission. In his schedule a visit to Stepanakert was included to negotiate with the officials of Karabakh. In the morning of February 27 the plane with Velayati on board took off for capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, but his plane landed in Aghdam.

At that moment, when Khojalu already two days was under the complete control of the Armenian forces, Rahim Kaziev, the head of extraordinary headquarters of defense of Shushi in a telephone conversation informed Baku officials that “the fights for Khojalu still continue” and that “the decision about the cease-fire (for security reasons during Velayati’s visit) is wrong in a situation when Armenians occupied Khojalu and will hardly be observed”.⁵⁵ In this message PFA member obviously tried to exclude the Iranian side from the mediatory attempts and particularly to frustrate A. Velayati’s mission.

The strengthening the Iranian influence in Azerbaijan, and particularly Teheran’s occurrence with a role of the mediation in settlement of Karabakh problem, obviously did not suit Ankara. The latter tried to spread its influence in the newly independent Muslim states and to create Union of Turkic-speaking states under its leadership.

And last but not least, after gaining independence by Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was considered by Ankara as an obstacle in the way for creating of an all-Turkic union “stretching from Adriatics to the Chinese wall”. For this reason and in this connection the Turkish side actively searched for a pretext for pressuring on Armenia trying to force it to comply with geopolitical concessions. Soon the Khojalu massacres were used as such pretexts.

On March 2, Minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Hikmet Cetin appeared with the statement for determination of the Turkish government to force the landing and examination of all planes flying to and from Armenia through the territory of Turkey. In this occasion the MFA of Turkey pointed out that such decision is justified by the CSCE final document adopted in Prague in February 1992.⁵⁶

In his turn Chairman of Great National Assembly of Turkey Husamettin Cindoruk called the international community to condemn “the act of genocide implemented with special cruelty by Armenians against our brother Azerbaijanis.” ⁵⁷

³⁵ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 253.

³⁶ Cited as in Khojalu, Chronics of genocide, p. 31-32.

³⁷ Zaur Kadimbekov, Tragedy in Khojalu, Pravda, 07.03.1992, Khojalu, Chronics of genocide, p. 29.

³⁸ See Khojalu, Chronics of genocide, p. 124.

³⁹ Compare with. Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 253, Report of Memorial, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992.

⁴⁰ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28.02.1992.

⁴¹ Khojalu, Chronics of Genocide, p. 19.

⁴² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 02.04.1992.

⁴³ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. pp. 253-255.

⁴⁴ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 255.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Izvestia, 12.11.1992.

⁴⁷ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 02.04.1992.

⁴⁸ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 257.

⁴⁹ А. Zverev, Ethnic conflicts in Caucasus, 1988-1994, Сontested borders in Caucasus, Мoscow, 1996, р. 32.

⁵⁰ Ibrahim Shukurov, Who will answer for genocide? Bakinski rabochi, 03.03.1992, see Khojalu: chronics of genocide, р. 137.

⁵¹ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. pp. 279.

⁵² Aziz Utkan, Ankara: Bizim Çoçuklar başardi, Hürriyet, Istanbul, 17.05.1992

⁵³ See Turkish Daily News, 14.04.1995.

⁵⁴ Cumhuriyet, Ankara, 23.06.1996, М. Feygan, Transcaucasus knot, Novij mir, Moscow, 1998, No. 8, p. 147.

⁵⁵ Мamed Safarly, Fightings in Karabakh still continue, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28.02.1992.

⁵⁶ Аydin Mehtiyev. Turkey condemns genocide, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 05.03.1992.

⁵⁷ IТАR-ТАSS, 05.03.1992.

The fact of participation of the 366th motorized rifle regiment of the CIS forces dislocated in Stepanakert is spread mainly by the refugees from Khojalu. The report by the Moscow “Memorial” also mentions that the fighting machines with their crews have participated in the assault. There is also an opinion that the participation of the military in the operations was not sanctioned by a written order of the regiment command.³¹

There an explanation to this entire jumble. Since January 1992 Stepanakert had been continuously shelled with artillery missiles from Shushi, Khojalu and the nearby villages of Kosalar and Jangasaran. No wonder part of the missiles and shells fell in the territory of the military unit destroying and killing several militaries from the regiment personnel. In February 1992 the Moscow radio and television reported on the issue. For instance, only on February 23 there were losses in the 366 regiment including 2 casualties and wounded personnel.³² To provide security of the regiment personnel the commander-in-chief of the CIS joint forces Air Marshall Ye. Shaposhnikov ordered the 366th regiment dislocated in Stepanakert to suppress the weapon emplacements. Worthy to mention that according to the order the suppression of the weapon emplacements had to be realized from the position of the regiment without the right to leave outside the territory of the military unit. The command of the regiment did use the opportunity and in March, before the withdrawal of the regiment from Stepanakert, the inhabitants of the city could see for several times an artillery duel between the Azerbaijanis and the soldiers of the CIS. At the same time the correspondent of TASS was informed in the headquarters of the Transcaucasus military district that the personnel had the right to suppress those weapon emplacements, which fire at the territory of the military unit.³³

In reality the personnel of the 366th motorized rifle regiment of the CIS did not take part in the Khojalu assault. As a matter of fact, there was no necessity in it for the Armenian armed formations had their own armored machines. As early as in the beginning of December they undertook disarmament of a Soviet militia regiment, thrown to Stepanakert to provide a regime of state emergency. As a result of this the Armenian detachments got a significant amount of rifle weaponry and several units of armored equipment (armored personal carriers (APC), and other type of military vehicles (BRDM) ). The small part of this equipment, even excluding the trophy equipment taken from the Azerbaijanis, would suffice to succeed in the operation.

We suppose the myth about the 366th regiment participation in the battles for Khojalu was born:

• as a result of the attempts by the Azerbaijani defenders of Khojalu to “justify themselves” to the compatriots;
• because the Khojalu assault was the fist time since the beginning of the conflict that the Armenian armed detachments used military armed equipment.

The following fact is another proof that the Azerbaijani authorities were informed on the forthcoming anticipatory assault of Armenians on Khojalu. By mid February 1992 before leaving for Minsk to the summit of the CIS, President A. Mutalibov ordered to throw all the accumulated reserves of the military equipment in the Aghdam region. 11 tanks and 12 infantry fighting machines BMP-2 were quickly delivered there, which together with the available in Aghdam 44 caterpillar armored machines of BRDM type, equipped with 12 millimeters calibers machine-guns presented an inspiring force, which could help the Khojalu settlers in case of an attack in any moment, but was also threaten Stepanakert itself.¹⁸

Besides, the Azerbaijani forces in Khojalu and the Aghdam region were equipped with over 35. 000 units of machine-guns and sub-machine guns with enough number of cartridges.¹⁹

R. Hajiev, member of the Aghdam department of PFA: «We could have helped the settlers of Khojalu, there were both forces and capabilities. But the leadership of the republic wanted to show the people that they lacked the force, and call for the help pf the CIS army once again, and to suppress the opposition with its help as well».²⁰

Evidently, the authorities and the opposition claim one another responsible for the tragedy. Mutalibov is obviously speculating the Aghdam armed forces being under his control, and not the PFA. In their turn the functionaries of PFA tried to gain reputation of law-abiding citizens in the world. No wonder looters took advantage of the chaos to earn money on the tragedy of compatriots. For instance, the informal deputy defense minister of Azerbaijan Fahim Hajiev did not shrink from taking bribes from the widows and the relatives the killed Azerbaijanis to deliver their bodies.²¹

By the beginning of the assault part of the civilian population of Khojalu left the settlement, and by the end of February 1992, according to various sources, some 1000 to 2500 people still remained there, mostly peaceful civilians and soldiers of Azerbaijani armed formations. On February 15 the Armenian side made an ultimatum: the civilian population of Khojalu was offered to leave with a white flag.²²

In the beginning of the attack, started on February 25, at 23:00 p.m., the Armeinan forces of NKR self-defense opened an aimed artillery fire against military objects and positions of the Azerbaijani forces, dislocated in the central part of the settlement. The successful shots spread havoc among the Azerbaijanis, which did not show serious resistance. Neither there was a more or less stubborn street fight in Khojalu; by 4 o’clock in the morning of February 26 the last centers of resistance were suppressed. Observers of the «Memorial» right protection organization inspecting the destructions in Khojalu confirmed the fact of artillery and not street fightings, which could result in a large number of casualties.²³ It is worth mentioning that the order number 1, regulating the conduct of the members of the Armenian armed forces of NKR self-defense, strictly forbid any kind of violence against the civilians of the adversary.

Thus the assurances of the Azerbaijani side on a supposed mass elimination of peaceful Azerbaijani inhabitants of Khojalu are being discredited. Moreover, the radio intercepts of Azerbaijani military in Aghdam, later published in Azerbaijani mass media, also witness the latter. One of them reads: “Don’t kill children and women. Gather them in the center.”²⁴ From our part we will mention that all the civilian population remaining in Khojalu was moved to Stepanakert and were passed without any conditions to the Azerbaijani side according to their will two days later. The fact of the voluntary handover of the inhabitants of Khojalu to Azerbaijan after a narrow inquiry was confirmed in the conclusion of the Moscow based right protection organization “Memorial”, as well as testified in a documentary film by a journalist from St. Petersburg Svetlana Kulchitskaya.

Part of the population began leaving Khojalu in Aghdam direction immediately after the start of the assault. Practically in all groups of the refugees there were armed people from the military garrison of the town. The people were leaving for two directions:

• from the eastern suburb of the town to north-east along the Karkar River bed, leaving Askeran on the left. The corridor was left by the Armenian side for the population to safely leave. The width of the corridor made from 100 to 300 meters;
• from the northern suburb of the town to north-east, leaving Askeran on the right. Only few used this way.²⁵

Worthy to mention, the so called “corridors”, naturally, were not limited to certain meters, as it may possibly seem. These were directions from where Armenians did not advance and where no one shoot, letting people leave the zone of military actions. In reality the width of the directions made a kilometer or more.

As we can see, the Armenian forces did their best to escape unnecessary deaths on the side of the civilian population of Khojalu. The mayor of Khojalu Elman Mamedov also knew about the corridor: “We knew the corridor was left for the civilian population to leave…”.²⁶

According to the report made by “Memorial”, nearly 200-300 people remained in Khojalu, hiding in the basements of the houses. After the assault they were moved to Stepanakert and were provided with food and medicines. The Armenian side stated it would agree to let them in exchange for its hostages.²⁷

The Armenians informed Azerbaijanis about the existence of the humanitarian corridor also by loudspeakers, although it is possible that the greater part of the Khojalu inhabitants could had had not heard the messages.²⁸

Indeed, it is likely, that not all the inhabitants of Khojalu had heard the warning, bu the masses of people moving in safe directions could have led the rest as well.

It is worth mentioning, that few days before the start of the assault the representatives of the Armenian side had repeatedly informed the authorities of Khojalu on the coming offensive using radio communication, calling them to take out the civilian population from the settlement immediately. The fact that this information was received by the Azerbaijani side and transmitted to Baku is confirmed also by a number of publications in Azerbaijani newspapers (Bakinskaya gazeta).²⁹

After the Khojalu offensive 13 hostages of Armenian origin were found and released, including one child and 6 women. ³⁰

On completion of the operation the troops of the Nagorno-Karabakh republican rescue service “Artsakh” found the bodies of 11 civilians, including one child and four women in Khojalu and its surroundings. This, of course, does not comprise the number of armed squadron members in military uniform. By the way, there number was not big either.

Thus all the rumors and accusations about the mass killings of civilian population in Khojalu are unmasked. On the other side, the fact of the death of many inhabitants of Khojalu remains unquestionable. How were hundreds of people killed and were exactly? The answer to this question reveals the truth and the fabrications about the events of February 1992.

¹⁸ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 251.

¹⁹ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 268.

²⁰ Izvestia, Moscow 12.04.1992.

²¹ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. pp. 255.

²² Helsinki Watch, op. cit., 1994, p. 20.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Azadlig, 26.02.1992.

²⁵ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992, T. Goltz, op. cit., p. 122.

²⁶ Russkaya misl’, 03.03.1992. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 02.04.1992.

²⁷ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 02.04.1992.

²⁸ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Statement of the Supreme Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, February, 1992.

By the time of neutralizing the weapon emplacements in Khojalu already two years had passed since the siege of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the independence of which was declared on September 2, 1991. Besides, the majority of inhabitants of the 24 deported villages found asylum in Stepanakert. Together with the earlier arrived Armenians from Azerbaijan, who escaped from pogroms in Sumgait, Baku, Mingechaur, etc., the number of the refugees, deportees and forcefully removed people settled in Nagorno-Karabakh exceeded 35.000, which made the 25 percents of the total population of NKR.

Between spring and autumn 1991 the Armenian settlements of Karabakh had been daily attacked by the brigands of the Azerbaijani militia. More than 700 people among civilians were taken to hostage by the militia, tens of thousands of cattle was driven out, thousands of hectares of grain sowings had been set to fire. The greater part of the Nagorno-Karabakh population was deprived of energy and water supplies.

Since September 1991 the residential areas of Stepanakert and many border settlements of NKR were under daily continuous bombardments with the use of artillery and modified anti-hail jet missile mounts Alazan and Kristal. Since January 1992 the weapons used against the civil population included also military jet missile launchers BM-21 Grad, banned for the use against settlements. Since mid-February 1992 Stepanakert was being rained down by 160 shells of Grad and Alazan daily.⁶

Two years later State Secretary of Azerbaijan Lala Shovket Hajieva would be reproaching the flocking Azerbaijanis on the bank of Arax River with the following words: «For more than hundred days we have been shelling Stepanakert, day and night, but Armenians did not leave their homes. You run already when there is no sound of explosion of the Armenians’ shells».⁷ Lets not complain about the inaccuracy of the highly-ranked lady – Stepanakert had been bombed for more than one hundred days; the fact of acknowledgment by the official Baku on sanctioned shelling of residential areas in the capital of NKR is more important to us.

As a result of the continuous siege, large number of refugees, drinking water blow ups and poisoning, as well as tremendous agricultural losses, in NKR, especially in the capital of the state, famine broke up. The situation worsened also by the lack of fuel for transport that disabled the delivery of food from the relatively safe villages. It is worth mentioning also that the OMON units of Azerbaijan had cut off almost all the inner thruways. Thus, many settlements in Artsakh appeared in double ring siege. The only hope of Armenians remained the helicopter communication with the Republic of Armenia, which, however, was unable to solve all the problems with food, taken into account the large number of wounded and the necessity medicines move-in.

“On January 25-28 I was in Stepanakert. The town still has neither electricity nor water. It is so difficult to get water that one feels ashamed to drink tea. The food coupons cannot be realized. People are swelling up of famine…Stepanakert reminds the newsreel of Leningrad in blockade”.⁸

The NKR population escaping the deadly shells was forced to live in unadapted basements; as a result the number of infectious illnesses and the death toll in the settlements of the republic rose dramatically. All the medical institutions in NKR were also moved to basements. Shellings, water, electricity and raw material shortage in Nagorno-Karabakh absolutely dysfunctioned the industrial enterprises, including those providing the population with food – bakeries, meat-packing plant and diary factory…

To save the starving population of the republic, to get an opportunity to deliver food from outside, providing population with the minimal medical help the only airport in NKR, located nearby the Azerbaijani populated village of Khojalu, had to be released. Worthy to mention, A. Mutalibov fully realized the vitality of the Khojalu airport for the population of NKR. That was the reason he ordered to destroy the landing strip and the aerodrome facilities, despite the fact that the order was never carried out. ⁹

The necessity for assault and the neutralization of weapon emplacements in Khojalu was dictated also by the availability of offensive arsenals accumulated there.

The leadership of NKR had to prevent the offensive against the Armenian rayon center of Askeran, and likely, Stepanakert, prepared by the armed forces of Azerbaijan. Thus, the military operation of the Armenian armed formations also had a preventive, pre-emptive meaning.

By the time of the Khojalu offensive, the Azerbaijani forces of the village possessed two jet missile launchers BM-21 Grad, four modified jet missile mounts Alazan, one hundred millimeter caliber cannon and three armored units.¹⁰ All of the technique was dislocated in the residential areas of Khojalu, from where the Armenian populated settlements had been shelled to destruction.

The NKR military reconnaissance, certainly, was aware that in Khojalu the assaults on Askeran and Stepanakert were being prepared. Elbrus Aliev, the voluntary unit commander of Khojalu also testifies this: “That day that is on February 25th we received information from Aghdam that at 5 o’clock (17:00 – H.D., L. M.-Sh.) we will launch the assault. We were looking for the beginning of the offensive. But there were no new news from Aghdam at all.” ¹¹

Neither were the Azerbaijani authorities surprised of the military operation of suppression of weapon emplacements on the side of Armenian units in Khojalu. The Azerbaijani side was informed about this by TV two months before the assault. An Azerbaijani author Arif Yunusov also wrote about this in the Moscow based Izvestiya newspaper. Long before the assault the Azerbaijani forces were suggested to take out the civil population from the village. The same suggestion was made to the Azerbaijani authorities in Baku. In fact, all the interested institutions and organizations were informed about the preparation for the assault in good time, which is confirmed by the data of the Azerbaijani mass media. ¹²

Here is an account of a woman living Khojalu given to Helsinki Watch on April 28th, 1992: “Armenians had brought an ultimatum that the settlers of Khojalu should better leave the town with a white flag. Alif Hajiev (leader of the Khojalu defense – H.D., L. M.Sh.) informed us about it on February 15 (10 days before the offensive! – H.D., L. M.-Sh.), but it didn’t frighten us. We never believed they could take Khojalu.” ¹³

However, as a result of these warnings the bigger part of the Khojalu inhabitants, aware of the prepared assault, moved to safe places in good time. The mass exodus of the population from Khojalu had been repeatedly recorded visually by the military reconnaissance of NKR, as well as been largely covered on Azerbaijani radio and television. At the same time, the Azerbaijani press purposefully formed a negative attitude towards population leaving Khojalu and constantly labeled them with shame.

Noteworthy, the forcefully moved people, despite the artificial obstacles, were the first to leave the once urbanized Khojalu. Moreover, informed by the Armenians beforehand the municipality of Khojalu had been asking for help in evacuating the population, although in vain. For instance, in an interview to the Moscow based “Megapolis -Express” newspaper the Khojalu mayor mentioned that “having received information on preparations for the seizure of the town, I asked the Aghdam authorities to send helicopters to evacuate the elders, the women and the children. We were being assured that a release operation was being prepared. But no help was given”.¹⁴

Thus, the Armenian side had been warning about the coming offensive, but Azerbaijanis did nothing to evacuate the civilians from the town. Neither attempts were made to save the population by helicopters, although Armenians did give such an opportunity. According to the survived Azerbaijani soldiers defending Khojalu, long before the bloody events the «food, medicines, arsenals delivery was suspended. And they were barehanded facing the enemy who fought under the cover of armored machines. Voluntarily or not, the outcome was prepared by the two sides».¹⁵

On February 24 the mayor of Khojalu E. Mamedov called to Aghdam, which informed about the coming attack and asked helicopters to evacuate the elders, women and children. «The help would not come».¹⁶

Apparently, the settlers of Khojalu were simply left to the mercy of fate. However, there still did not know about the most terrible – they had to pay with their own lives the tribute to the omnivorous Moloch, well known in Azerbaijan as POWER STRUGGLE.

⁷ Azerbaijani State Television, 24.06.1994.

⁸ Novoye vremya weekly, Moscow, No. 8, 1992.

⁹ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 255.

¹⁰ From the short version of report of Memorial human rights protection center “Memorial”, see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18. 06.1992.

¹¹ Nasiman Yakublu. Destruction of Khojalu, (in Azerb.), Baku, 1992, p. 74.

¹² Azadlig, 28. 02. 1992.

¹³ See. Tomas Goltz, Azerbaijan: Requiem for a Would-Be Republic, ISIS, Istanbul, 1995.

¹⁴ Megapolis-Exspress, No. 17, 1992.

¹⁵ Vadim Belikh, Nagorni-Karabakh, Everyday horror of the war, Izvestia, No. 62, 1992.

¹⁶ Khojalu: Chronics of genocide, prepared by Elmira Akhundova, Baku, 1993, p. 16

3. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN IN 1991-1992

Independence of Azerbaijan gained as a result of the collapse of the USSR in 1991 logically drew to a complicated political situation in Azerbaijan. The major competing forces in the country were the incumbent old Communist nomenklatura and the growing oppositional Popular Front (hereinafter – PFA). Both sides speculated over the developments in Nagorno-Karabakh and aspired to exploit them against one another in their power struggle.

In January 1990 violent pogroms and massacres against the Armenian population of Baku, numbering over 200 000, were organized. This made the Soviet authorities to bring Soviet army into the capital of Azerbaijan. The PFA interpreted the introduction of the Soviet army forces in Baku soundly as a menace to its growing influence, and decided for an armed resistance. The clashes between people from the PFA and the Soviet armed forces brought to tens of dead from both sides and served as cause for launching a large-scale anti-governmental campaign by the opposition. The PFA expected to gain sympathies of the majority of the population in Azerbaijan by this and prepare grounds for seizing power. The gap between the leadership of Azerbaijan and the opposition continuously grew; neither did the sides disdained dirty means in this political confrontation. According to the president of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov the PFA “by extremism, by shape, by structure is a Communist, Bolshevik movement. They have supporting cells, functionaries – nothing new except for the name. The PFA has turned into a real ultra nationalistic movement.”¹ Noteworthy, Mutalibov, an experienced Communist himself, had to be well aware that Communism is a supranational ideology recognizing only class differences. At the same time he had to be well aware also about the level of hatred towards the Communism among Azerbaijanis. That is the reason he labels his political opponents that way.

However, the influence and capabilities of the PFA in Azerbaijan were still growing, and already by the end of 1991 practically all the Azerbaijani armed forces and formations operating in Nagorno-Karabakh were oriented towards the PFA and were controlled directly from the center of that organization. It is also worth mentioning that the NF of Azerbaijan in its foreign policy landmarks held on to pro-Turkish line and received a significant amount of support from Ankara.

The PFA position solidified especially after the August coup attempt in Moscow. Being at the moment on an official visit to Iran A. Mutalibov did not manage to grasp the upheaval of political struggle in Moscow and quite unequivocally spoke in support of the GKChP, which remained unnoticed neither by the president of the USSR Gorbachev, nor in the pro-Yeltsin circles. Thus, deprived of the support from Moscow A. Mutalibov was left in his homeland to face the PFA alone.

Тhe peacemaking mission of B. Yeltsin and N. Nazarbaev and the signing of a joint communiqué between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Zheleznovodsk served to be a good opportunity to somewhat improve the situation and to get control over it.

However, the development of events in that direction obviously did not suit the oppositional forces in Azerbaijan and the PFA in particular, while Mutalibov still continued to demonstrate a lack of political foresight astonishing for a figure of his rank. The map of Karabakh still remained the strongest trump card in the anti-presidential struggle for power.

It did not take much effort to PFA to find new ways for political struggle. On November 19th on the frontline between the Martuni region of Karabakh and Agdam region of Azerbaijan an Azerbaijani helicopter crashed in enigmatic circumstances. Many state officials of Azerbaijan, the military superintendent of the Region in the State of Emergency General Zhinkin, as well as the representatives of the president of Kazakhstan and Russia, who had arrived in the conflict zone with observational mission died in the crash.

In Azerbaijan, probably mechanically, the accident was declared to be a diversion organized by the Karabakhis. However, the accusations against the Armenian side were proved to be groundless and no more or less weighty proofs of their connection to the catastrophe were found. Indirect proofs on the connections of the Azerbaijani side to the helicopter crash are brought in the book by Th. Goltz.²

The air crash in November 1991 shook Mutalibov’s position significantly. The thing was that A. Mutalibov’s most faithful brothers-in-arms were on board of the crashed helicopter. Deprived of the closest supporters A. Mutalibov realized that was losing the power confidence in Baku. According to K. Stolyarov, Mutalibov had no choice but to regret that he «did not bind in one the catastrophe in the Karabakh sky with the immediately increased activity of the opposition. It was there one should look for solution of the problem, which, unfortunately, did not and for which he soon had to pay».³

Catastrophe nearby the village of Berdashen (Karakend) sharply changed A. Mutalibov’s conduct and approaches, who by the time already was realizing a certain vulnerability of his positions in the Karabakh conflict settlement.

Disagreement between the president of Azerbaijan and the opposition in the person of the Popular Front became apparent also in the approaches and the methods of resolution of the Karabakh problem. In the first half of 1991 Mutalibov was supporting the most radical measures towards the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Mutalibov’s position became apparent, particularly, in the operation Koltso (Ring in Russian), unprecedented by its scope and violence, when the Azerbaijani OMON and the Soviet troops in Karabakh deported the whole population of 24 Armenian villages. However after the autonomous status of Karabakh was abolished by the Azerbaijani Majlis (parliament), Mutalibov repeatedly spoke against activities aimed at full cessation of relations with Armenia.

As Stolyarov witnesses, since the beginning of the Stepanakert shelling by Grad artillery mounts from Shushi, A. Mutalibov was harshly criticizing the then defense minister of Azerbaijan Rahim Gaziev for irresponsibility and ignorance of the possible counteractions from the Armenian side. After being informed about the Stepanakert shelling by Grad artillery mounts, Mutalibov connected with R. Gaziev and said quite strictly: “What are you up to? I suppose you believe there is no such Grad with Armenians? Why, of course! Have you ever thought what would be with Shushi? … For the future, don’t you dare to do on your own!”⁴ But the Stepanakert bombardment not only did not stop, but, on the contrary, intensified from day to day. We can only suppose that gaziev continued «to do on his own», i.e. the army was already not controlled by its commander-in-chief. There another possible scenario also: well aware of the huge number of death toll among the civilians in Stepanakert and the tremendous damages of the NKR capital, Stolyarov simply tries to distance A. Mutalibov from the barbarous shelling of the city overcrowded with refugees. But here also Mutalibov did not look at his best. Worthy to mention, he was concerned with the possible adequate response against his compatriots rather than the fact of shelling a peaceful town with a numerous population with a banned weapon.

The fact remains that during the Karabakh war the Azerbaijani army was quite frequently used for political aims, which raises no doubts even among the Azerbaijanis themselves. This peculiarity of the Azerbaijani army is well known also in international organizations.⁵

² Tomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, New York, 1998, pp. 115-120.

³ Kiril Stolyarov, Raspad: ot Nagornovo Karabakha do Belovezhskoy Pushi, Moscow, 2001, pp. 271-272.

⁴ Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. pp. 121-122, Respublika Armenia, Yerevan, 31. 01, 1992.

⁵ Azerbaijan. Seven Years of the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, New York, 1994, p. 7.

2. SOURCES

The sources used in this research are mainly comprised of several works of a documentary type. Those are books by an American journalist Thomas Goltz The Azerbaijan Diary and that by a Russian columnist Kirill Stolyarov Raspad: ot Nagornovo Karabakha do Belovezhskoy Pushi. Both works, except for their source study characteristics and witness information, are distinguished if not for anti-Armenian then, at any case, are notable for open pro-Azerbaijani sympathies of the authors. At the same time, the mentinoed sympathies are expressed towards various political camps of the Azerbaijani political elite. Thomas Goltz’s work, along with its anti-Russian and anti-Armenian orientation, is saturated also with sentiments against Mutalibov and an overt sympathy to the activists of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. Stolyarov’s book, on the contrary, is targeted against the functionaries of the Popular Front and stands out for obvious pro-Mutalibov sympathies. The comparison of the data brought by the two authors permits to freely picture the political situation and state of the mind of various political groups in Azerbaijan on the threshold of 1991-1992 in general, and the Khojalu events in particular.

The authors of this work (one of us, by the way, took part in the operation of liberation of Khojaly in person) tried to escape using materials of the Armenian press (except for their own works on the given topic) and gave special attention to Azerbaijani publications in the press, the Internet, etc.

The materials on the Khojaly events by some of the Azerbiajani publications contain interesting data, which, alternatively interpreted, will allow for more objective conclusions than those drawn without a scrupulous analysis and criticism.

The study also used materials containing official information, as well data by Azerbaijani, Turkish, Russian and the Western media.

Real truth about events happened in Khojaly on February 26, 1992

1. FOREWORD

Armenian is a gyavur.* Armenian is a tyrant. Armenian is a bloodsucker…
Armenian is a dirty spot on the name of Great Allah, on the whole
lucid mankind… Hey, heirs of lucid Mohammad! Always be aware of the
gyavur Armenian. Armenian sucks the human blood.

These is an excerpt from a call refrained for over ten times from Nasiman Yagublu’s book “The Crash of Khojalu” (in Azerb.). Published in Baku this book breathes with hatred towards the Armenian ethnos and is saturated with calls to annihilate Armenians as an ethnos.

At the end of February 1992 the armed divisions of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic made a successful effort smoothing the weapon emplacements in the Khojalu settlement and releasing the airport nearby the settlement. Unfortunately, some details of the military operation in our history of not so far ago are still covered with dark. The official Baku skillfully uses this circumstance and tries to use it for getting its political aims, while the destiny of the Khojalu settlers and other Azerbaijani refugees have been turned into a safe haven for the Azerbaijani authorities in stirring both domestic and international propaganda. It is noteworthy, that all the propaganda is conducted with vividly manifested anti-Armenian insinuations and is used for forcing ethnic intolerance and enmity towards Armenians among Azerbaijanis.

For more efficiency of such propaganda the state propaganda machine of Azerbaijan stops at nothing: distortion of reality, serving facts to quite the contrary, falsification of historical sources…The mass media in the republic has tried so hard that it frequently denies its own propagandist sallies.

Sharply ten years have past since the Khojalu assault made by Armenian formations. The following death of hundreds of civilians in the Aghdam region the Azerbaijani authorities serve to the international community as a massacre of Azerbaijanis by Armenians. In the modern Azerbaijan the so called “Khojalu events” are qualified exclusively as genocide. Many published books and articles, organized seminars and conferences refer to this topic… Tens of Internet sites and web pages are created that use materials devotes to this truly tragic events, while the selection of the materials to them is based on the principle of selectivity, tendentiousness and an overt tendency to hyperbole.

Be that as it may, the coverage of these events still contains a portion of inaccuracy, false information and simple lack of coincidence and mutual exclusion. Taken this fact into account we aimed at studying and a full and unbiased illumination of the events of February 1992 to the most possible extent.

The task is not an easy one: to write a work about the prehistory and the reason behind the death of hundreds of people. Besides the moral and ethical side of the problem, there is also fear of being accused of bias in illuminating the events.

At the same time, having undeniable facts of deliberate distortion of the events taken place and their further politicization, we tried to distance ourselves from apologia. The major principle in writing down this study is the strict adherence to the principle of historicity and scientific objectivity. The research is done based on different sources and publications, mainly ignored by the Azerbaijani side. What was its purpose and to what extent it succeeded is upon the reader. From our part we believe that the full illumination of the picture of Khojalu settlers’ death in the interests of Azerbaijan’s ideologists, for in that case the myth of Armenian connection to that crime will simply cease to exist.

http://budapest.sumgait.info/khojaly/main.htm